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The Mobile Phone Technology, Gender Inclusive Education and Public Accountability in 
Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
 






This study assesses the relevance of mobile phone technology in complementing gender 
inclusive education (i.e. primary, secondary and tertiary) to promote public accountability (i.e. 
involving horizontal, vertical and diagonal accountability dynamics).  The study utilizes the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) technique to establish the empirical evidence based on 
48 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2005-2018. The following findings are 
documented from the linkages between mobile phone technology, inclusive education and public 
accountability. First, the interactions between mobile phone technology and inclusive education 
promote public accountability. Second, with regard to net effects, while unexpected negative 
signs are established, the corresponding positive interactive effects indicate that enhancing the 
penetration of mobile phone technology beyond some critical thresholds ensures positive net 
effects. Hence, policy makers should ensure that mobile phone technology penetration exceeds 
the established thresholds in order for gender inclusive education to positively affect public 
accountability.  
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1. Introduction 
Public accountability is attributed to be the hallmark of modern democratic governance that acts 
as a check on the tyranny of leaders who tend to privatize executive power (Bovens, 2007; 
Schmitter, 2004; Mulford & Moreno, 2006). Northern Ireland Open Government Network 
(2015) clarified the definition of the concept that public accountability is concerned with the 
obligation of public servants to provide actual performance information, explain decision-
making and justify behaviour which raises public questions, enables public debates to ensure 
transparency in governance and permits the imposition of sanctions on the government over 
inefficient performance cases as well as misuse of executive power. Public accountability is 
important as it serves as a check not just for evaluative purposes but also for preventive 
purposes, hence, enhancing the learning capacity of public administration through information 
sharing for public scrutiny.  
Information has been established to be a key building block to a wide range of strategies that 
attempt to tackle weaknesses in public service and public accountability (Lindsay & Tamar, 
2017). A strategy as posited by Northern Ireland Open Government Factsheet (2015) entails the 
use of information to trace connections between the past, present and future for better decision 
making. Lindsay and Tamar (2017) further mentioned that for an improved public accountability 
system, three crucial factors must be taken into consideration, namely: the availability of 
transparent and reliable data/information; the digital technological dividends and the tension 
among the various stakeholders in the economy. This stresses the important role that information 
technology has to play in public accountability, as the dissemination tools are equally as 
important as the information.  
Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) performance in educational quality (or gender inclusive 
education), and public accountability, Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) noted the poor education 
policy syndrome in the region. Some of the issues faced by the SSA’s education system include 
relatively poor infrastructure (Ejemeyovwi, Osabuohien & Osabohien, 2018) and education 
facilities (Antoninis, 2009; Ejemeyovwi, Osabuohien, Johnson & Bowale, 2019)1. Information 
technology on another note is not approaching saturation levels in the region because of the high 
potential for more technology adoption (Asongu & Boateng, 2018; Ejemeyovwi & Osabuohien, 
                                                             
1The terms “education quality”, “school enrollment”, “inclusive education” and “gender-inclusive education” are 
used interchangeably throughout the paper.  
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2020). This claim is evident in Figure 1. In addition, governance and institutions in Africa have 
been relatively poor (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2019) and this 
indicates the relatively low level of public accountability trend in the region. 
20 40 60 80 100 120
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
Sub-Saharan Africa
North America
Middle East & North Africa
European Union
East Asia & Pacific
Figure 1: Mobile phone penetration in different regions 
Information technology is important for public accountability, and in the same vein, educational 
quality is important not only for public accountability but also for information technology 
(Bovens 2007). This is so because some level of educational quality is required for adequate 
technology utilization and at the same time, educational quality ensures the demand for public 
accountability. Some education is required for handling some of the complex processes offered 
by technological innovations (Cloete, 2017).  Educational quality also informs the public 
servants about the need for public accountability and the technological medium to disseminate 
information to the public.  
Notably, extant contemporary public accountability literature has fundamentally concentrated on 
inter alia: emphasis on public accountability and public policy changes through voters’ reaction 
to changes in tax policy (Mörk & Nordin, 2019); design framework for public accountability in 
the educational reform (Hutt & Polikoff, 2020); relationship between transparency and ethical 
accountability (Herrera & Mahecha, 2018); empirical perception of forms of public 
accountability (Reddick, Demir, & Perlman, 2020); the relevance of anti-corruption measures for 
accountability performance (Heinrich & Brown, 2017); establishing citizen political knowledge 
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for accountability (Opalo, 2020); an assessment of public accountability, public expenditure and 
financial accountability (Loozekoot & Dijkstra, 2017); investigating the nexuses of political trust 
and armed conflict underpinning accountability (Gates & Justesen, 2020); the determinants of 
information disclosure to foster accountability for sustainable transnational governance 
(Schleifer, Fiorini & Auld, 2019); and the importance of digital transparency in the convergence 
of public accountability (Ramírez & Tejada, 2019). 
The examination of the “educational quality” – “technology threshold” – “public accountability” 
hypothesis in SSA is motivated by the relatively poor performance of the variables as discussed 
above and extant gap apparent in literature. The present study departs from studies such as 
Abugre (2018) who emphasized the importance of governance in promoting the quality of higher 
education; Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) who focused on enhancing the role of technology on 
quality education in SSA; Tchamyou, Asongu and Odhiambo (2019) who examined the role of 
information technology in modulating the effect of education and lifelong learning on income 
inequality and economic growth in Africa by a couple of ways; Ekong, Adiat, Ejemeyovwi and 
Alalade (2019); and Alalade, Ejemeyovwi,  Ekong and Adeyemo (2019). The study differs by 
examining public accountability as against the use of other common governance and institution 
variables. The study considers the mobile technology threshold while examining the role of 
educational quality on public accountability and focus on the SSA region is due to the relatively 
poor performance of public accountability in the sub-region.    
Building on the conceptual issues above and extending the work of Asongu and Odhiambo 
(2019), this study’s objectives are: (i) to establish the net effect of mobile phone technology in 
modulating the effect of educational quality on public accountability and (ii) provide policy 
makers with minimum thresholds of mobile phone penetration needed to harness educational 
quality to promote public accountability. The corresponding research questions are the 
following: (i) what is the net effect on public accountability from the role of mobile phone 
technology in moderating the incidence of educational equality on public accountability? (ii) 
What levels of mobile phone technology penetration should be attained for educational quality to 
promote public accountability? 
To achieve the stated objective, the study is structured as follows: section two presents the data, 
technique of estimation and other methodological issues associated with the study. Regarding the 
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analysis, the study utilizes the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique of estimation 
to analyse the data with a view of handling possible endogeneity issues in the empirical model. 
Section three deals with presentation and discussion of results whereas section four concludes 
the paper with implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
Following the motivation of this study, the research assesses the panel dataset of forty-eight (48) 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2005-2018. The choice of the selected countries 
and periodicity is limited by data availability. This study sources data from two reputable 
databases, namely, (a) Varieties of Democracy database (V-Dem), and (b) World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.  
First, accountability indicators are obtained from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database. 
The database is created to produce better democracy indicators. V-Dem contains over 350 
indicators on democracy and political system, which dates from 1789 till recent times. It is 
acclaimed that the procedures underpinning the construction process of the dataset are more 
transparent compared to other social science databases (Dom, 2018). From the database, four 
accountability indicators are sourced. These include: the vertical accountability index, diagonal 
accountability index, horizontal accountability index and accountability index. Details on the 
construction of the accountability indicators can be found in Lührmann et al. (2017), however a 
summary is outlined in Appendix 1 for definitions and sources of variables. 
Second, the mobile phone penetration, educational quality and control variables are sourced from 
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. In accordance with Tchamyou (2017) 
from knowledge economy literature, the mobile phone penetration is measured by the mobile 
cellular subscriptions (per 100 people). 
The educational quality indicator used in the study is the “primary school enrollment, secondary 
school enrollment and tertiary school enrollment” gender parity indexes. The reasons 
underpinning the employment of these educational indicators include the lifelong learning 
motives and the necessity of educational quality in socio-economic development (Asongu, 2020; 
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Asongu, Orim, & Nting, 2019). Moreover, these educational quality variables also double as 
gender inclusive variables given the relevant feature of gender inclusion in sustainable 
development goals (SDGs).  
Three control variables (i.e. gross domestic product growth, population growth and foreign direct 
investment) are adopted for this study in which their influence remains debatable. Economic 
growth and population have been used by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018) to predict the 
negative signals of Arab Spring governance. However, a positive nexus could be expected from 
these indicators because countries with higher income levels are associated with higher 
democratic standards while a growing population requires more devoted government resources 
in managing the population (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) as well as demands for public 
accountability. Likewise, financial globalization (i.e. foreign investment) is said to weaken 
domestic governments and citizens' emancipation because it encourages self-interest by 
prioritizing the dominance of markets over the interests of domestic governments, thereby 
influencing the standards of governance (Asongu, Nting, & Nnanna, 2020; Farazmand, 1999; 
Lalountas, Manolas & Vavouras, 2011). It is important to emphasize that the adoption of limited 
control variables is consistent with scholarly literature because in the GMM approach, there is a 
choice between avoiding variable omission bias and having robust estimates. This procedure is 
consistent with GMM-centric empirical studies that select less than three control variables to 
eliminate issues surrounding instrument proliferation (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020b; Kavya & 
Shijin, 2020). Appendix 1 provides the definitions and sources of variables; Appendix 2 captures 
descriptive statistics while Appendix 3 discloses the correlation matrix. 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 GMM specification 
In the light of the attendant literature, data behaviour usually determines the choice of the 
estimation strategy adopted in a study. The choice of GMM approach builds on five justifications 
in accordance with contemporary literature (Asongu, 2020) which are  discussed in no order of 
importance. First, the number of the cross sections (i.e. N) should exceed the corresponding 
number of periods (i.e. T). Given that there are forty-eight sampled Sub-Saharan African 
countries for fourteen years (i.e. 2005-2018), the N>T criterion for the adoption of the GMM 
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estimation is fulfilled. Second, a degree of persistence should be maintained in the data 
behaviour. This procedure is met because the four accountability indicators adopted in this study 
remain persistent and this is evident as the correlation between their respective level and first lag 
values is higher than the rule of thumb of 0.800 (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020b). Third, pertaining to 
the data structure and nature of the panel dataset, it is obvious that the empirical analysis 
accounts for cross-country differences in the estimation strategy. Fourth, the system GMM 
estimator considers the inherent biases in the difference GMM approach. Fifth, the study deals 
with the endogeneity issue through (a) the application of internal instrumentation to control for 
simultaneity and (b) utilization of time-invariant omitted indicators to account for the unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Among the extant GMM approaches, this study follows the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) approach, 
an improvement of Arellano and Bover (1995) technique, which has been documented in recent 
literature to limit instrument proliferation ( Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019). 
This study adopts the two-step approach that addresses the heteroscedasticity issues instead of 
the one-step procedure that only controls for homoscedasticity. Below equations in level (1) and 
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(2)           
where ,i tA  
is the accountability indicator (i.e. accountability index, horizontal accountability 
index, vertical accountability index, diagonal accountability index) of country i in period t, 0  is 
a constant, M represents the mobile phone penetration (i.e. mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 
people)), E reflects the educational quality measures (gender parity “primary school enrollment, 
secondary school enrollment and tertiary school enrollment”), ME denotes the interactions 
between the mobile phone penetration and educational quality (“mobile phone penetration x 
primary school enrollment”, “mobile phone penetration x secondary school enrollment”,  and 
“mobile phone penetration x tertiary school enrollment”), W is the vector of control variables 
(GDP growth, population growth and foreign direct investment ),   denotes the coefficient of 
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autoregression that is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is capable of 
capturing past information, 
t
  is the time-specific constant, t  is the country-specific effect and 
,i t  is the error term. 
2.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions 
The identification and exclusion restrictions are indispensable for a robust GMM estimation. 
This is consistent with contemporary literature (Asongu et al., 2020b; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016; Tchamyou, 2020b) that validates “years” to be strictly exogenous whereas all explanatory 
variables (i.e. the educational quality indicators, mobile phone penetration proxy and the control 
variables) are acknowledged as predetermined and suspected endogenous. This identification 
approach is consistent with Roodman (2009b) and Meniago and Asongu (2018) who argue that it 
is unlikely for “years” to turn out to be endogenous after a first difference.2 
In accordance with the above stance, years affect the accountability dynamics exclusively 
through the predetermined and endogenous variables. Specifically, the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) is employed to establish the statistical validity of exclusion restrictions procedure. Thus, 
the underlying exclusion assumption only holds when the null hypothesis of the DHT is not 
rejected. This means that the assumption of exclusion restrictions is validated provided the 
alternative hypothesis of the DHT relating to instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is 
rejected. Moreover, the identification procedure and the exclusion restrictions validity criterion 
are in line with the standard instrumental variable Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) 
test. This indicates that the strictly exogenous variables influence accountability dynamics 
exclusively through the exogenous components of the endogenous explaining variables (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). 
3. Results 
3.1 Results presentation 
Tables 1-4 present the empirical findings. In Table 1, the linkages pertain to the relationship 
between the mobile phone, education quality and the accountability index whereas Table 2 
discloses the nexuses between the mobile phone, education quality and the horizontal 
                                                             
2Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is “iv (years, eq [diff])” whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
10 | P a g e  
 
accountability index. While Table 3 is concerned with the associations between the mobile 
phone, education quality and the vertical accountability index, Table 4 captures the connections 
between the mobile phone, education quality and the diagonal accountability index. Each table 
has three main specifications in line with the three main independent variables of interest (i.e. 
primary school enrollment, secondary school enrollment and tertiary school enrollment). In 
addition, all specifications have two sub-specifications (i.e. one without control variables and the 
other with the set of control variables). To establish the validity of the estimated models, four 
information procedures are duly employed.3 In this light of the established information 
procedures, the estimated models are overwhelmingly valid without any exemption. 
In accordance with the recent literature based on the interactive regressions (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a), the study computes the net effects to assess 
the incidence of mobile phone penetration in modulating the effect of educational quality on 
public accountability. For example, in Column 1 of Table 1, the net effect of mobile phone in 
modulating the effect of primary school enrollment on accountability index is -0.136 ([57.206 x 
0.00244] + [-0.276]). In this computation, 57.206 is the mean value of mobile phone penetration, 
0.00244 is the conditional effect from the interaction between mobile phone penetration and 
primary school enrollment while -0.276 is the unconditional effect of the primary school 
enrollment. 
The study establishes the following findings from Table 1-4. There are negative net effects from 
the role of mobile phone in modulating the effect of education quality (i.e. primary school 
enrollment, secondary school enrollment and tertiary school enrollment) on accountability index. 
There is a negative net effect from the relevance of mobile phone in modulating the effect of 
primary school enrollment on horizontal accountability index. In addition, there are negative net 
effects from the importance of mobile phone in modulating the effect of education quality (i.e. 
primary school enrollment, secondary school enrollment and tertiary school enrollment) on 
                                                             
3‘‘First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the 
absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification 
restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are 
valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by 
instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the 
proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most 
specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the 
validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also 
provided’’ (Asongu et al., 2020) p.177) 
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diagonal accountability index. However, it is important to emphasize the absence of some net 
effects from the modulating incidence of mobile phone on educational quality for public 
accountability. This occurrence signals the incapability of non-state actors to watch over and 
reprimand the activities of the politicians and the civil servants. Most of the control variables 
with significance have the expected signs. 
3.2 Discussion and policy implications through established thresholds 
The established negative net effects are unexpected because mobile phone penetration was 
anticipated to modulate educational quality for the promotion of public accountability. The 
unexpected negative effects can be traceable to the prevalent gender exclusion in school 
enrollment and low levels of public accountability. Although the marginal effects between the 
mobile phone and educational quality are consistently positive from the findings, the 
unconditional effects of the mobile phone and educational quality remain negative. However, 
these independent negative effects are not interpreted independently in interactive regressions 
because interactive regressions are not interpreted as linear additive models (Tchamyou, 2019). It 
follows that the stand-alone indicators (i.e. mobile phones and educational quality measures) 
must be understood concurrently with the corresponding conditional effects in order to assess the 
overall incidence on public accountability: this is the main justification for computing net effects 
and thresholds in interactive regressions. Having established the net effects, this study also 
proceeds with the computation of minimum thresholds at which mobile phone could enhance 
education quality (i.e. gender inclusive education) for public accountability. These thresholds 
have policy implications because below the critical masses, mobile phone penetration is not high 







12 | P a g e  
 
Table 1: Mobile phone, educational quality and accountability index 
       
 Dependent Variable: Accountability Index 
       
Variables Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
       
Acc. Index (-1) 1.121*** 1.043*** 1.014*** 1.069*** 1.033*** 0.947*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0424) (0.0342) (0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0225) 
Mobile -0.00236** -0.000508 -0.000132 -0.00127* -0.000523** 0.000200 
 (0.00113) (0.000394) (0.000177) (0.000738) (0.000220) (0.000139) 
PSE -0.276***   -0.210***   
 (0.0733)   (0.0537)   
SSE  -0.0238   -0.0353**  
  (0.0251)   (0.0160)  
TSE   -0.0363***   -0.00481 
   (0.0121)   (0.00765) 
       
Mobile x PSE 0.00244**   0.00133*   
 (0.00120)   (0.000718)   
Mobile x SSE  0.000402   0.000608***  
  (0.000407)   (0.000169)  
Mobile x TSE   0.000255**   0.0000696 
   (0.0000957)   (0.0000571) 
       
GDP    0.000558** 0.000852*** 0.00107*** 
    (0.000269) (0.000282) (0.000317) 
Population    0.00231 0.00460 -0.000517 
    (0.00384) (0.00306) (0.00243) 
FDI    -0.000532*** -0.000465*** -0.000138* 
    (0.000127) (0.000111) (0.0000811) 
       
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects -0.136 na -0.022 -0.134 -0.001 na 
Positive Mobile Threshold(s) 113 na 142 158 58 na 
       
AR(1)_P-value [0.015] [0.045] [0.016] [0.017] [0.040] [0.018] 
AR(2)_P-value [0.209] [0.290] [0.116] [0.299] [0.321] [0.133] 
Sargan Prob [0.788] [0.009] [0.880] [0.604] ]0.005] [0.041] 
Hansen Prob [0.567] [0.174] [0.256] [0.548] [0.316] [0.320] 
       
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group [0.114] [0.008] [0.768] [0.491] [0.062] [0.260] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous) [0.754] [0.724] [0.186] [0.508] [0.672] [0.384] 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group    [0.368] [0.037] [0.245] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous)    [0.594] [0.833] [0.410] 
       
Fisher 136.2*** 2145*** 587.4*** 1002*** 2686*** 258482*** 
Number of Instruments 27 27 27 39 39 39 
Number of Countries 48 44 42 47 43 42 
Observations 471 348 311 465 342 308 
***, **, *: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Acc: Accountability. Mobile: mobile phone technology. PSE: primary school 
enrollment. SSE: secondary school enrollment. TSE: tertiary school enrollment. GDP: GDP growth. Population: population growth. FDI: foreign 
direct investment: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. 
The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen tests. Constants 
are included in all regressions. ( ) for standard errors of estimated coefficients and [ ] for p-values of all other tests with the exception of the 
Fisher test. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects or thresholds is not significant. 
The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 57.206. 
 
In the light of the aforementioned clarifications, in Column 1 of Table 1, a threshold of 113 
(0.276/0.00244) represents the minimum mobile phone penetration threshold for gender 
inclusive primary education to have a net positive effect on public accountability. In the 
computation, 0.276 is the absolute value of unconditional effect for gender inclusive primary 
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education on the accountability index while 0.00244 represents the conditional effect between 
mobile phone penetration and gender inclusive primary education on the accountability index. 
Table 2: Mobile phone, educational quality and horizontal accountability index 
       
 Dependent Variable: Horizontal Accountability Index 
       
Variables Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
       
Horizontal Acc. Index (-1) 1.057*** 0.960*** 0.934*** 1.036*** 0.992*** 0.938*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0473) (0.0442) (0.0175) (0.0228) (0.0295) 
Mobile -0.00311** -0.000665 0.000332 -0.00157** -0.000702** 0.000171 
 (0.00134) (0.000563) (0.000245) (0.000759) (0.000336) (0.000153) 
PSE -0.257**   -0.191***   
 (0.109)   (0.0395)   
SSE  0.0109   -0.00837  
  (0.0379)   (0.0229)  
TSE   0.00515   0.0116 
   (0.0165)   (0.0160) 
       
Mobile x PSE 0.00332**   0.00172**   
 (0.00145)   (0.000736)   
Mobile x SSE  0.000649   0.000680**  
  (0.000632)   (0.000287)  
Mobile x TSE   -0.000101   -0.0000949 
   (0.000141)   (0.000103) 
       
GDP    0.00153*** 0.00155*** 0.00245*** 
    (0.000472) (0.000434) (0.000617) 
Population    0.00294 0.00132 -0.00347 
    (0.00308) (0.00417) (0.00490) 
FDI    -0.000584** -0.000440* 0.000109 
    (0.000222) (0.000255) (0.000118) 
       
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects -0.067 na na -0.093 na na 
Positive Mobile Threshold(s) 77 na na 111 na na 
       
AR(1)_P-value [0.018] [0.026] [0.044] [0.016] [0.021] [0.043] 
AR(2)_P-value [0.164] [0.420] [0.249] [0.186] [0.389] [0.256] 
Sargan Prob [0.704] [0.016] [0.852] [0.777] [0.057] [0.429] 
Hansen Prob [0.659] [0.432] [0.237] [0.839] [0.427] [0.274] 
       
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group [0.264] [0.028] [0.078] [0.202] [0.137] [0.042] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous) [0.703] [0.868] [0.398] [0.966] [0.658] [0.687] 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group    [0.736] [0.089] [0.324] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous)    [0.740] [0.796] [0.289] 
       
Fisher 457.6*** 1152*** 9372*** 78505*** 5863*** 1352*** 
Number of Instruments 27 27 27 39 39 39 
Number of Countries 48 44 42 47 43 42 
Observations 471 348 311 465 342 308 
***, **, *: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Acc: Accountability. Mobile: mobile phone technology. PSE: primary school 
enrollment. SSE: secondary school enrollment. TSE: tertiary school enrollment. GDP: GDP growth. Population: population growth. FDI: foreign 
direct investment: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over -identifying Restrictions Test. 
The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen tests. Constants 
are included in all regressions. ( ) for standard errors of estimated coefficients and [ ] for p-values of all other tests with the exception of the 
Fisher test. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects or thresholds is not significant. 
The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 57.206. 
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It holds from the computed thresholds that a mobile phone penetration level of below 113 is not 
favourable for gender inclusive primary education to induce a positive effect on public 
accountability. Furthermore, under the specification without control variables in Table 1, the 
corresponding threshold of mobile phone is 142 for gender inclusive tertiary education to induce 
a positive effect on the accountability index. Specifications with control variables in Table 1 
establish that minimum thresholds of mobile phone are 158 and 58 (per 100 people) for gender 
inclusive primary education and gender inclusive secondary education respectively, to promote 
accountability index. 
Table 3: Mobile phone, educational quality and vertical accountability index 
       
 Dependent Variable: Vertical Accountability Index 
       
Variables Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
       
Vertical Acc. Index (-1) 0.737*** 0.735*** 0.609*** 0.866*** 0.791*** 0.655*** 
 (0.118) (0.109) (0.0950) (0.0587) (0.0374) (0.0518) 
Mobile -0.000606 0.00122 0.00123** 0.00262 0.000753 0.00125*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00102) (0.000550) (0.00170) (0.000479) (0.000427) 
PSE -0.254   0.186*   
 (0.165)   (0.107)   
SSE  0.0872   0.120***  
  (0.0601)   (0.0220)  
TSE   0.00825   0.0180 
   (0.0408)   (0.0433) 
       
Mobile x PSE 0.00138   -0.00219   
 (0.00189)   (0.00179)   
Mobile x SSE  -0.000595   -0.000278  
  (0.00111)   (0.000436)  
Mobile x TSE   0.0000105   -0.000401 
   (0.000331)   (0.000302) 
       
GDP    0.000639 0.000737 0.000599 
    (0.000619) (0.000482) (0.000789) 
Population    0.00805* 0.0105*** -0.0140** 
    (0.00445) (0.00216) (0.00584) 
FDI    -0.000353* -0.000414** 0.000269 
    (0.000192) (0.000154) (0.000414) 
       
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects na na na na na na 
Positive Mobile Threshold(s) na na na na na na 
       
AR(1)_P-value [0.016] [0.097] [0.028] [0.035] [0.126] [0.042] 
AR(2)_P-value [0.015] [0.233] [0.111] [0.026] [0.287] [0.081] 
Sargan Prob [0.344] [0.006] [0.386] [0.013] [0.0001] [0.089] 
Hansen Prob [0.611] [0.500] [0.273] [0.611] [0.624] [0.201] 
       
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group [0.176] [0.068] [0.533] [0.184] [0.119] [0.148] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous) [0.722] [0.778] [0.218] [0.804] [0.888] [0.320] 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group    [0.086] [0.643] [0.303] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous)    [0.953] [0.509] [0.213] 
       
Fisher 12.72*** 1221*** 32.78*** 4950*** 400.6*** 436.4*** 
Number of Instruments 27 27 27 39 39 39 
Number of Countries 48 44 42 47 43 42 
Observations 471 348 311 465 342 308 
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***, **, *: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Acc: Accountability. Mobile: mobile phone technology. PSE: primary school 
enrollment. SSE: secondary school enrollment. TSE: tertiary school enrollment. GDP: GDP growth. Population: population growth. FDI: foreign 
direct investment: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over -identifying Restrictions Test. 
The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen tests. Constants 
are included in all regressions. ( ) for standard errors of estimated coefficients and [ ] for p-values of all other tests with the exception of the 
Fisher test. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects or thresholds is not significant. 
The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 57.206. 
 
In addition, the corresponding thresholds in Table 2 for mobile phone penetration are between 77 
and 111 (per 100 people) for gender inclusive primary education to positively promote the 
horizontal accountability index. It follows that above the established thresholds, mobile phone 
penetration will moderate gender inclusive primary education for an overall positive effect on the 
horizontal accountability index.  
As apparent in Table 3, neither net effects nor thresholds are computed for the nexuses between 
mobile phone technology, gender inclusive education and vertical accountability. This is 
essentially because, as clarified in the footnote of the attendant table, both estimated coefficients 
relevant for the computation of net effects and/or thresholds should be significant before the 
computations of net effects and corresponding thresholds.  
The following thresholds for mobile phone (per 100 people) can be established from Table 4. 
Between 77 and 80 “gender inclusive primary education”; 64 and 122 “gender inclusive 
secondary education” and 150 “gender inclusive tertiary education” for the diagonal 
accountability index. It can be concluded that such thresholds have economic significance and 
make economic sense because the computed thresholds fall within the minimum and maximum 
values in the summary statistics. In addition, the concept of threshold is consistent with the 
recent literature on the importance of critical masses in complementary and substitution effects 
for economic development (Asongu & Asongu, 2019; Asongu et al., 2020; Hammoudeh & 
McAleer, 2015). Moreover, it is relevant to note that, in the real world, inclusive education and 
mobile phone technology do not interact in isolation to influence public accountability. Hence, 
while the modeling exercise is tailored to engage specifications with and without a conditioning 
information set (i.e. control variables), our best estimators are from estimations with a 
conditioning information set. 
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Table 4: Mobile phone, educational quality and diagonal accountability index 
       
 Dependent Variable: Diagonal Accountability Index 
       
Variables Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
       
 Diagonal Acc. Index (-1) 1.052*** 1.059*** 1.082*** 1.072*** 1.074*** 1.002*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0356) (0.0417) (0.0134) (0.0153) (0.0187) 
Mobile -0.00276** -0.00123** -0.000366 -0.00242*** -0.000675** -0.000167 
 (0.00122) (0.000558) (0.000244) (0.000803) (0.000327) (0.000109) 
PSE -0.225***   -0.197***   
 (0.0743)   (0.0409)   
SSE  -0.0739***   -0.0723***  
  (0.0185)   (0.0143)  
TSE   -0.0656***   -0.00690 
   (0.0182)   (0.00949) 
       
Mobile x PSE 0.00293**   0.00246***   
 (0.00130)   (0.000810)   
Mobile x SSE  0.00116**   0.000594**  
  (0.000503)   (0.000287)  
Mobile x TSE   0.000436***   0.000176*** 
   (0.000128)   (5.91e-05) 
       
GDP    0.000664** 0.000224 0.00134*** 
    (0.000248) (0.000345) (0.000358) 
Population    -0.00693*** -0.00604* 0.00151 
    (0.00238) (0.00314) (0.00165) 
FDI    -0.000324*** -0.000280** 0.000125 
    (9.43e-05) (0.000109) (0.000119) 
       
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects -0.057 -0.008 -0.041 -0.056 -0.038 na 
Positive Mobile Threshold(s) 77 64 150 80 122 na 
       
AR(1)_P-value [0.083] [0.031] [0.007] [0.082] [0.029] [0.017] 
AR(2)_P-value [0.189] [0.618] [0.129] [0.244] [0.851] [0.083] 
Sargan Prob [0.148] [0.122] [0.496] [0.278] [0.226] [0.025] 
Hansen Prob [0.162] [0.234] [0.479] [0.189] [0.264] [0.108] 
       
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group [0.017] [0.061] [0.312] [0.019] [0.070] [0.391] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous) [0.534] [0.435] [0.480] [0.684] [0.566] [0.087] 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group    [0.064] [0.220] [0.081] 
Dif (null, H=exogenous)    [0.490] [0.356] [0.261] 
       
Fisher 705.9*** 18213*** 389*** 1231*** 1989*** 161478*** 
Number of Instruments 27 27 27 39 39 39 
Number of Countries 48 44 42 47 43 42 
Observations 471 348 311 465 342 308 
***, **, *: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Acc: Accountability. Mobile: mobile phone technology. PSE: primary school 
enrollment. SSE: secondary school enrollment. TSE: tertiary school enrollment. GDP: GDP growth. Population: population growth. FDI: foreign 
direct investment. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions 
Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the 
null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen tests. 
Constants are included in all regressions. ( ) for standard errors of estimated coefficients and [ ] for p-values of all other tests with the exception 
of the Fisher test. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects or thresholds is not 
significant. The mean value of mobile phone penetration is 57.206. 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
This study assesses the linkages between the mobile phone penetration, educational quality (i.e. 
in terms of gender inclusive education) and public accountability to establish the minimum 
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threshold of mobile phone penetration for education quality to promote public accountability in 
48 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2005-2018. Four accountability measures are 
used, namely, accountability index, horizontal accountability index, vertical accountability index 
and diagonal accountability index. The mobile phone penetration is proxied by the mobile 
cellular subscriptions (per 100 people). Three educational quality measurements are employed: 
gender inclusive primary education, gender inclusive secondary education and gender inclusive 
tertiary education. The study establishes the following main findings. There are negative net 
effects from the role of mobile phone in modulating the effect of education quality on public 
accountability. 
Although the negative net effects are unexpected, the unexpected negative effects can be 
traceable to the prevalent low levels of gender inclusive education and public accountability. 
Accordingly, from the findings, the marginal effects between mobile phone and educational 
quality are consistently positive, which motivates the computation of mobile phone technology 
thresholds needed for net positive effects on dynamics of public accountability. 
Given that our best estimators are specifications with a conditioning information (i.e. control 
variables), the minimum mobile phone penetration  thresholds are: (a) 158 (per 100 people) for 
gender inclusive primary education; and 58 (per 100 people) for gender inclusive secondary 
education to positively influence accountability index; (b) 111 (per 100 people) for gender 
inclusive primary education to positively promote the horizontal accountability index and (c) 80 
(per 100 people) for gender inclusive primary education and 122 (per 100 people) for gender 
inclusive secondary education to positively promote diagonal accountability index. It can be 
concluded that such thresholds have economic significance and make economic sense because 
the computed thresholds fall within the minimum and maximum values in the summary statistics. 
It is also worthwhile to articulate that the negative unconditional effects of inclusive education in 
the accountability dynamics is an indication that inclusive education is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the promotion of public accountability in the sampled countries. Hence, it 
is relevant for the underlying inclusive education channels to be complemented with other policy 
variables in order to engender the anticipated effects on public accountability. Moreover, given 
that the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 57.206, relative to the computed thresholds; it 
implies that sampled countries have to promote policies favoring mobile phone penetration in 
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order for the potentials effects on public accountability to be realized. Such policies can be 
tailored towards addressing constraints in affordability as well as the lack of the relevant 
infrastructure which are considerable barriers to information and communication technology 
access. The attendant policies to be implemented should be centered around, inter alia: 
facilitating low pricing schemes from mobile operators.  
The findings of this study have shown that when mobile phone penetration have reached certain 
critical masses, policy designed to promote inclusive education can lead to public accountability, 
most probably because the mobile phone can be used to emphasize the level at which citizens of 
a country can participate in holding their elected and government officials to account. It is 
important to also emphasize that the findings cannot be extended to all countries because counter 
arguments exists in countries such as China where the mobile cannot be substantially used to 
facilitate voting and universal suffrage.  
The main caveat of the study is that country-specific effects are not taken into account in an 
effort to avoid endogeneity originating from the nexus between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term. Hence, it would be worthwhile for future research to engage country-specific 
empirical techniques with the relevant data in order to provide findings with more country-
specific implications. Future studies can also focus on assessing how the established findings 
withstand empirical relevance within the framework of other developing regions such as Latin 
America and Asia. Moreover, taking on board other variables that can be leveraged to modulate 
gender-inclusive education in the light of promoting public accountability is worthwhile. By 













Appendix 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variables Acronyms Definitions Sources 
    
Accountability index Accountability “Government accountability is understood as 
constraints on the government’s use of political power 
through requirements for justification for its actions 
and potential sanctions.” 
V-Dem 
Vertical accountability index Vertical “Vertical accountability captures the extent to which 





Horizontal “Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state 
institutions to oversee the government by demanding 
information, questioning officials and punishing 
improper behavior.” 
V-Dem 
Diagonal accountability index Diagonal “Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions 
and mechanisms that citizens, civil society 
organizations CSOs, and an independent media can 
use to hold the government accountable.” 
V-Dem 
Mobile phone Mobile Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
Primary school enrollment PSE School enrollment, primary (gross), gender parity 
index (GPI) 
WDI 
Secondary school enrollment SSE School enrollment, secondary (gross), gender parity 
index (GPI) 
WDI 
Tertiary school enrollment TSE School enrollment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index 
(GPI) 
WDI 
GDP growth GDP GDP growth (annual %) WDI 
Population growth Population Population growth (annual %) WDI 
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Note: V-Dem = Varieties of Democracy Database; WDI = World Bank Development Indicators. Abbreviation: Accountability, accountability 
index; vertical, vertical accountability index; horizontal; horizontal accountability index; diagonal, diagonal accountability index; mobile, mobile 
phone technology; PSE, primary school enrollment; SSE, secondary school enrollment; TSE, tertiary school enrollment; GDP, GDP growth; 
Population, population growth; FDI, foreign direct investment. 
 
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variables Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
      
 Accountability 666 .659 .223 .026 .946 
 Vertical 666 .664 .195 .069 .938 
 Diagonal 666 .694 .237 .038 .957 
 Horizontal 666 .568 .275 .013 .966 
 Mobile 657 57.206 39.829 .538 184.298 
 PSE 512 .939 .089 .553 1.158 
 SSE 381 .885 .198 .347 1.388 
 TSE 336 .759 .449 .064 3.46 
GDP 644 4.438 4.807 -46.082 20.716 
 Population 665 2.499 .923 -2.629 5.028 
 FDI 641 5.067 9.09 -6.37 103.337 
 
Abbreviation: Accountability, accountability index; vertical, vertical accountability index; horizontal; horizontal accountability index; diagonal, 
diagonal accountability index; mobile, mobile phone technology; PSE, primary school enrollment; SSE, secondary school enrollment; TSE, 
tertiary school enrollment; GDP, GDP growth; Population, population growth; FDI, foreign direct investment.  
 
 
20 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
            
 Accountability Vertical Diagonal Horizontal Mobile PSE SSE TSE GDP Popul FDI 
Accountability 1           
Vertical 0.907*** 1          
Diagonal 0.948*** 0.786*** 1         
Horizontal 0.898*** 0.835*** 0.755*** 1        
Mobile 0.373*** 0.431*** 0.263*** 0.389*** 1       
PSE 0.283*** 0.307*** 0.185** 0.293*** 0.465*** 1      
SSE 0.311*** 0.363*** 0.155* 0.420*** 0.471*** 0.659*** 1     
TSE 0.219*** 0.268*** 0.0838 0.345*** 0.553*** 0.343*** 0.674*** 1    
GDP -0.0848 -0.0595 -0.0840 -0.0563 -0.223*** -0.130* -0.203** -0.207** 1   
Population -0.229*** -0.296*** -0.0910 -0.369*** -0.440*** -0.301*** -0.621*** -0.716*** 0.159* 1  
FDI 0.105 0.0558 0.117 0.0779 0.116 0.117 0.132* 0.297*** 0.0172 -0.0710 1 
            
*p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001. Abbreviation: Accountability, accountability index; vertical, vertical accountability index; horizontal; horizontal 
accountability index; diagonal, diagonal accountability index; mobile, mobile phone technology; PSE, primary school enrollment; SSE, 
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